Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

State of Utah v. Douglas Rex Young : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry R. Kelley; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Young, No. 197614531.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/364

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

L A W Lio,'?

r>

v

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

„0I

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

DOUGLAS REX YOUNG,

:

Case No. 14531

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal from a conviction in the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Peter F. Leary, presiding.

LARRY R. KELLER
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Telephone:
532-5444
Attorney for Appellant
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

n "!"
i in 1 1 ii
| i i i n TVI i i jri i
ni >"i i| i in in
> I'
Ij I i i: i d :> u r KLMc. i-« u" u n, J. 0 r

i ni i i i

i ii|iii i

n
i i i

i n i:« a i A I 1:.

r

i i

11 i ,i" \j i

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No. 14531

DOUGLAS REX YOUNG,
re f endant - Ap p e 11 an, t

BRIEE OF APPELLANT

•

This is an appeal from a conv Iction in the Third District
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
reue.

-.eary , pre siding.

LARSY > , <ELLEP
• • "
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, 7tan
84102
Telephone:
532-544i
Attorney --*r An :ell^~ t

VERNON r>. K U M N E Y
Attorney General
State Capitol Building:
Salt Lake City, Utar
A f" T O ^"^ P v

c

nr

^ P 9 - - :•** r».-' ,- • •

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1
. .

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT FALL
WITHIN THE CONDUCT SOUGHT TO BE PROSCRIBED BY THE
LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-201
(1973 AS AMENDED).

3

A. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ATTEMPTING, COMMITTING, OR
FLEEING FROM A BURGLARY."
3
B. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT
BAR BECAUSE A POCKET KNIFE, AS WAS USED IN THIS CASE, IS
NOT A DANGEROUS WEAPON. . .'

4

C. THE INJURY TO MR. SNYDER IS INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY AGGRAVATION OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY

8

POINT II: THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A PROFERRED JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE IN A SELF-DEFENSE
SITUATION
CONCLUSION

9
14

CASES CITED

Blount v. State, 376 S.W. 2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964)

7

State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac. 950 (1929)

10

State v. Williams, 110 Ariz. 104, 515 P.2d 849 (1973)

7

Page
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(10) (1973 as amended) . . . . . . . . .

5,6

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(b) (1973 as amended) . . . . . . . . .. 13, 1^
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1973 as amended) . . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §76 -6-202 (1973 as amended) . . .

.

. . . . . . 6
1

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1973 as amended) . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 3:
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203(1)(a) (1973 as amended) . . . . . . . . .8, 1'
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203(b) . . . ' . . •
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1973 as amended) . . . .

5
. . . . . . . -5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

DOUGLAS REX YOUNG,

:

Case No. 14531

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery
in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of the crime of
aggravated burglary, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1973
as amended).

Following his conviction, appellant was sentenced to

the indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison,
where he is presently incarcerated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks remand of the case for a new trial or, in
the alternative, a reduction in degree of the conviction to the crime
of burglary, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-202 (1973 as amended).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 12:30 p.m. on November 13, 1975 Mr. John Snyder,
manager of an apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and his wife
were returning home when they passed in the apartment walkway
an individual later identified to be the defendant (T. 24,25).
After entering their apartment on the top floor of the nine-unit
complex, Mr. Snyder heard a jarring noise coming from the bottomfloor apartment of Miss Lynette Ross (T.26).
his wife to call the police.

Mr. Snyder instructed

He left his apartment, ran out of the

building and around to the patio area of apartment number 3, belonging
to Miss Ross.

Through the closed sliding galss doors that separate

the patio area from the interior of the apartment Mr. Snyder observed
a man, whom he identified to be the appellant, dash out of a
bedroom inside the apartment (T.35),

The man jumped up on a kitchen

counter and tried to open a window on the opposite side of the
building, but was unsuccessful.

Mr. Snyder then ram around to the

front of the building, looked through the window, and observed an
empty apartment.

He then ran to the front of another building and

observed the appellant running west down a small alleyway.

Mr.

Snyder pursued him across two adjoining lawns, then overtook and
subdued him.
Mr. Snyder grabbed his arms and forced them behind appellant's
back, then escorted him to the front lawn area of the apartment
house.

When they arrived, Mr. Snyder attempted to force appellant

to the ground; Mrs. Snyder announced that the "police were on the
way/1 (T. 32). When Mr. Snyder attempted to force the face of
-2-

appellant into canine excrement

on the grass (T. 115), appellant

began to struggle with Mr. Snyder.
struck in the nose,

Mr. Snyder was subsequently

A pocket knife was produced from appellant's

pocket and he loosed himself from the control of Mr. and Mrs.
Snyder.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Snyder was cut by the knife in the

struggle.

Followed at a distance of fifteen feet by Mr. Snyder,

appellant ran to his automobile and drove away, but not before
Mr. Snyder was able to obtain the vehicle license number.
Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated
burglary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE
CONDUCT SOUGHT TO BE PROSCRIBED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-203 (1973 AS AMENDED).
A. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ATTEMPTING, COMMITTING, OR FLEEING
FROM A BURGLARY.'f
The appellant was not "fleeing" from a burglary when the
injury to Mr. Snyder occurred; his flight had been terminated by
his capture.

He peacefully accompanied Mr. Snyder back to the

apartment house.

It was not until Mr. Snyder used excessive force

upon the Defendant that he resisted and, in self defense, initiated
the struggle wherein Mr. Snyder was injured.
Appellant does not deny that the above struggle with Mr.
Snyder took place; he does, however, disavow any participation in
the burglary of Miss Ross1 apartment.
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Appellant testified he was

innocently at that location looking for a friend's apartment and that
he ran out of instinct (T. 122). The struggle with Mr. Snyder,
resulting in his escape, was only initiated after the enraged Mr.
Snyder would not explain to the appellant the reasons for his actions
when he tried to force the appellantfs face into canine excrement
on the lawn.
B. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR
BECAUSE A POCKET KNIFE, AS WAS USED IN THIS CASE, IS NOT A DANGEROUS
WEAPON.
Defendant submits that the Legislature, in enacting Section
76-6-203, intended to punish more severely the carrying of a
weapon during the commission of a burglary.

This is due to the

peculiar nature of the crime of burglary; it is not an offense
wherein a person's life is necessarily endangered.

But if a

weapon is used or carried during the attempt, commission, or
flight from the burglary, human life may be endangered.

Since

burglary is committed predominently in situations involving stealth and
secrecy, being caught in the act is certainly likely to cause the
burglar to become surpirsed.

Where there is a dangerous weapon which

may be used to assist him in continuing his crime or fleeing therefrom,
the danger to human life is present.

This goes well beyond the initial

purpose of the crime (i.e. to commit a burglary); it is the potential
situation where a burglar—frightened and surprised by his discovery
and impending capture— irrationally uses the weapon he has
procurred for that purpose.

This the evil the Legislature has

proscribed in Section 76-6-203.

-4-

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302, (1973 as amended) defining the
crime of aggravated robbery, conditions that crime upon the use of
a "firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon; . . . "Thus, the use of a pocket, knife
in a robbery clearly aggravates that crime to that of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony.

It is important to note that

in this section the legislature was very explicit (i.e. firearms,
knives, and their facsimiles, and other "dangerous weapons")
in specifying how the crime

of robbery is elevated to that of

aggravated robbery.
In defining aggravated burglary in Section 76-6-203(b)
the Legislature used only the words "dangerous or deadly weapon."
Defendant submits that such language indicates a two part legislative intent:

first, to utilize the statutory [§76-1-601(10)]

definition of "deadly weapon" in applying the aggravated burglary
statute; secondly, to avoid characterizing a "knife" as a "deadly
weapon" as a matter of law.
The aggravated robbery statute §76-6-302 makes such a characterization; using even a facsimile of a knife aggravates the crime of
robbery.

If in all situations a knife were intended by the Legis-

lature to be cause for aggravating the crime of burglary, it could
have easily chosen wording similar to that used in Section 76-6-302.
It did not do so—most likely because it did not want to make the
similar characterization.
The Legislature has defined "deadly or dangerous weapon"
to mean:
-5-
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. . . anything that in the manner of its use or intended
use is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury."
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1973 as amended) and Utah Code
Ann. §76-1-601(10) (1973 as amended)

containing the specific

definitions to be used in the burglary sections of the Penal Code,
does not redefine "deadly or dangerous weapon.11

Thus, for the purposes

of aggravated burglary, the definition contained in Section 76-1-601
(10) must be applied.
Clearly a pocket knife is not per se a "dangerous weapon."
Unlike a firearm, the usual purpose of which is to cause "death
or serious bodily injury", a pocket knife has many uses— woodcarving,
sharpening pencils, cleaning fingernails, improvised screwdriver,
and so forth— for which it can be casually and innocently carried and
used.

It must be admitted that a pocket knife may be used in a

manner of use or intended use which is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury; but such a characterization could be applied
to any item (a crowbar, screwdriver, even furniture or lamps
which might be used to strike someone on the head).

The screwdriver

carried by a burglar to pry open a door, when used to stab a person
in the abdomen or chest, could cause "death or serious bodily injury"
and would thus become a "deadly weapon."

But such a screwdriver

would not justify a prosecution for "aggravated" burglary unless that
item were actually used in a manner "likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury;"

merely carrying the item during the commission of

the crime is insufficient aggravation.
Courts have consistently refused to characterize pocket
knives as dangerous weapons.

See for example Blount v. State,
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376 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
court held that a pocket knife

In Blount, the Texas

six inches long, used to produce

several wounds, the longest of which was two and one half inches
long, in the victim, was not a "deadly weapon'1 for the purposes
of an assault with intent to commit murder statute.

However,

there are other jurisdictions which have declared that knives —
to include pocket knives— are "dangerous weapons when used in the
commission of a crime.

See for example State v. Williams, 110 Ariz.

104, 515 P.2d 849 (1973).

Appellant submits that most of the cases

wherein courts of other jurisdictions have characterized pocket
knives as dangerous weapons have involved robberies or assaults in
which the knife has been used as an offensive weapon.

This is

likewise the result in Utah, for if a knife (or even a facsimile
thereof) is used in a robbery, the crime is elevated to that of
aggravated robbery.
However, in a burglary situation, as previously noted,
a knife is not as a matter of law a dangerous weapon; it can only
be such if the "manner of its use or intended use is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury."
In the present case appellant withdrew the knife from his
pocket only after extensive physical abuse at the hands of Mr.
Snyder (T. 115, 116). The knife was not

used in an offensive

manner whatsoever; it was used strictly for the self-defense of the
Defendant.

Indeed, after the knife was produced the Snydersf lost

control of appellant and the struggle ceased; brandishing the knife,
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the Defendant withdrew and told the Snyders to keep away.
(T. 33)

The knife was not used in stabbing, gashing, plunging,

or any other motions associated with the use of a knife in an
offensive attack.

Indeed, neither of the two Snyders1 was even

cut by the knife during the struggle.

Clearly the appellant's

use of the knife (in self-defense to cause cessation of the physical
abuse by Mr. Snyder, in a non-attacking manner, while at the same time
retreating from the struggle) cannot be so construed to be "likely
to cause death or serious injury,"

as required by the statute.

There is likewise no evidence that appellant "intended to cause"
such injury through the use of the knife; all that was proven was that the
appellant withdrew from the struggle and proceeded to his automobile.
C. THE INJURY TO MR. SNYDER IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
AGGRAVATION OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY.
During the trial Mr. Snyder testified that during the
struggle, the Defendant punched him in the nose, for which he
received medical treatment. (T.35) Defendant submits that this type
of injury does not fall within the type of injury covered in
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203(1) (a) (1973 as amended).

As will be

discussed below, the proposed jury instruction which was not given
would have cured any defects.

The jury would have been instructed

that the appellant could not have been found guilty of aggravated
burglary if his actions (punching Mr. Snyder in the nose) were
used only after unnecessary and unreasonable force was used against
him.

At the time Mr. Snyder was struck in the nose, no knife had

been produced.

Mr. Snyder had previously subdued the appellant
-8-

twice— once at the point of apprehension and once upon the return
to the lawn area of the complex.

Mr. Snyder had the appellant in a

full-Nelson hold before he broke free.

When Mr. Snyder attempted

to grab hold of him again, he was punched in the nose.

Appellant

would argue that he has a right of self defense; a right to use
reasonable force to defend himself against another's imminent use
of unlawful force against him.

A punch in the nose is certainly

not escalating the amount of force used in the struggle; appellant
had been on the "receiving end" of the struggle twice before.
Surely this single punch in the nose, and resultant injury to Mr.
Snyder, cannot be construed to be within the intent of the
Legislature in defining "aggravated burglary."
POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
TRIAL COURTTS REFUSAL TO GIVE A PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION
REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE IN A SELF-DEFENSE SITUATION.
During the trial the trial judge instructed the jury:
•

INSTRUCTION NO. 19

You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to the extent that
he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself against another's imminent use of unlawful
force; however, a person is justified in using a force which
is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to
himself.
A person is not justified in using force if he is
attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission~ of a felony.

-9-

INSTRUCTION NO. 20
Any person is justified in using any force, except
deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary
to effect an arrest or to defend himself from bodily
harm when making an arrest.
Appellant, in a timely and appropriate manner, moved
(T. 130) to have the trial court include the following instruction:
Even though you are instructed that a person is not
justified in using force or threats against another when he
is fleeing after the commission of a felony, if you find
from your deliberations that force or threats were used
by the defendant, Douglas Rex Young, only after unnecessary
and unreasonable force was used against him, and if you
find that Douglas Rex Young did in fact commit the crime of
burglary, then you may find the defendant'guilty of the
crime of burglary of a Dwelling, a felony of the second
degree, but not guilty of the crime of Aggravated Burglary,
a felony of the first degree.
The trial judge refused to give this instruction and the Defendant
took proper exception to that decision.

(T. 168).

This refusal deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial
because it withdrew from the province of the jury the opportunity
to determine whether or not the appellant's actions were justified;
it deprived the appellant of his right to have the jury determine
his theory of the case.
In State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac. 950 (1929), the
Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a similar situation.

In that

case, involving a burglary conviction, the defendant appealed his
conviction on the basis inter alia of "the refusal of the court
to give certain requested instructions submitted by defendant; . . ."
(supra 279 Pac. at 952).

Those instructions specifically

detailed the intent possessed by the defendant requisite to a
conviction for burglary.

Defendant had asserted a defense of honest

belief that he had a right to the property later determined to belong
-10-

to another.

In reversing the conviction, the court held that the

given instruction did not
fl

properly reflect the appellant's theory . . . The
appellant was entitled* to have his theory . . . go to
the jury in the form of a proper instruction from the court,
properly reflecting appellant's theory upon this essential
fact, whether or not the appellant believed he had a right
to enter, which the jury must find before it could render
a verdict.
The instruction given by the court did not properly
and fully inform the jury upon the law or this point"
279 P. at 952, 953.
Throughout the trial appellant asserted that the knife was
drawn and the threats were made only after unreasonable force
was being applied to him (T. 116). The principal witness for
the State, Mr. Snyder, testified on cross-examination that he
"walked11

appellant back to the apartments.

(T. 47) Only after

Mr. Snyder attempted to place appellant in a lying-down position
(T. 47) did he begin to struggle. . On direct examination
(T. 31) Mr. Snyder testified that after he had overtaken appellant
some distance away from the burglarized apartment, he tackled
him.

He (Snyder) testified (T. 31): "After I knocked him down,

I got up very quietly and told him to stay there."
(by Deputy County Attorney):
Snyder):

Question

"What did he do?" Answer (by Mr.

He stayed there, muttered some words."

Mr.

Snyder then escorted him back to the front lawn area

of the apartment complex.

Snyder then instructed him to lay on the

front lawn of the apartment building.

When he "didn't want to,"

Snyder "pushed" him down by applying "pressure downward ro make him
bend his knees and get down."

(T.32) At this point a struggle ensued,

wherein Mr. Snyder was struck in the nose.

Shortly thereafter

appellant removed from his pocket a knife (T. 116) and told Mr. Snyder
-11-

and his wife to keep away. (T. 34).
Appellant admitted that he was involved in such an altercation
with Mr. Snyder; however, he claimed that the altercation was the
result of a case of mistaken identity.

Appellant produced the

knife only after Mr. Snyder had struck him "quite a few times11
(T. 127). Appellant's account of the force used upon him by Mr.
Snyder is found at (T. 115, 116).
Instruction Numbers 19 and 20 are correct assertions of the
law as applied to usual cases.

However, when applied to this case,

the given instructions do not "properly and fully inform the jury
upon the law or this point."

Evans, supra.

Appellant submits that

the intent of the legislature is not being followed by the refusal
of the proposed instruction.

First, for the reasons enumerated in

Point I above, appellant's actions do not fall within the statutory
proscription; and secondly, the legislature intended to punish
(by the aggravated burglary statute) only those who would use force
or dangerous weapons to assist in their escape; it cannot be applied
to one

who would use such a method to assist in his being freed from

an enraged person who was physically assaulting him.
As previously stated, appellant feels that Insturctions 19
and 20 are correct assertions of the law— at least for cases unlike
the present case.

The second paragraph of Instruction 19 states:

A person is not justified in using force if he is
attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of a felony.
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The statutory basis for such a jury instruction is found
in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(b) (1973 as amended).

However, the

refusal of the trial court to give the proposed instruction
substantially prejudiced appellant.

When the second paragraph of

Instruction 19 is considered, and there is no qualifying or
conditional language as is found in the proposed jury instruction,
then appellant is almost automatically convicted of aggravated
burglary.

Surely this cannot be the intent of the legislature.

To allow such an interpretation of the statute is in essence
saying the following:

any person charged with simple burglary cannot

use any force whatsoever— in self defense or even in defense of his
own life—-to oppose unlawful force imposed upon him by an arresting
citizen, without risking prosecution for aggravated burglary if that
arresting person is in some way injured.

In the context of this

particular case, where the injury to Mr. Snyder and the use of the
knife by appellant are crucial to the case, in that they are necessary
to prove the aggravation of the crime, such an error is clearly
harmful to the defendant.

He ought to be entitled to have the jury

decide whether or not his actions of self-defense were reasonable
and justified.

The proposed jury instruction

jury to decide the case properly.

would have helped the

Here the use of force by the

appellant is critical to the crime:

if justified in his use thereof,

he cannot be convicted of aggravated burglary.

This case is unique

in this respect, because for most other crimes appellant's actions
(in using force) during the crime

or at the time of flight have no

real bearing on the prosecution for that crime (even though a separate
crime of assault would be involved).
-•n-

Appellant would submit that the legislature, in enacting
Utah Code Ann. §§76-2-402(15) (L973 as amended) and 76-6-203(1)
(1973 as anlended) , did not intend to deprive suspected persons of the
right to self defense against the unreasonable use of force.
The given jury instructions had that effect.

That error could

have been cured had appellant's proposed instruction been given,
but it was not.

Such prejudicial error requires reversal of the

conviction and a retrial of the case.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the
conviction be reversed and the case be remanded for retrial allowing
the jury to consider appellant's theory of the case.

In the alter-

native, the appellant seeks a reduction in sentence to that for simple
burglary, a second-degree felony.
DATED this

day of August, 1976.
Respectfully submitted

LARRY R. KELLER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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